Amtrak versus the shutdown

A rail crew replaces a switch on October 4th in preparation for reconnecting the Saint Paul Union Depot to allow Amtrak service.

Amtrak, the National Passenger Railroad Corporation, could cease to be a “national” network if the federal government shutdown drags on. The company has said that it can ride out a short-term shutdown, on the order of “several weeks“, but it’s unclear what might happen beyond that point. The good news is that the company is in better financial health than they have been in a decade or more, somewhat extending the window of time they can operate without federal assistance. The bad news is that it would still be a extremely difficult task to find the $100 million or so per month they would need to keep running the company as it is today.

The federal shutdown has also come at an impeccably bad time for boosters of the Saint Paul Union Depot project. As you read this, work is progressing on finally connecting the station to mainline tracks in order to allow the Empire Builder to return to a downtown stop it hasn’t visited since Amtrak was formed in 1971—the return may only be shortlived.

Of course, political figures have proposed zeroing out Amtrak funding numerous times over the years, or slicing it up into regional businesses, so some thought has been put into how the company might try to cling to life. Until now, at least, the railroad has always received enough support to keep limping along. There have been occasional bursts of greater investment, but never the sustained influx of cash that the company has needed to get a truly stable footing.

Probably the most popular idea has been for Amtrak to condense service down to the Northeast Corridor, the 453-mile D.C.–Philadelphia–New York–Boston line which accounts for more than a third of passenger traffic on the system, and about half of the revenue. That’s because there are dozens of trains per day on the NEC, a frequency of service far higher than anywhere else (most of Amtrak’s overall route mileage only has one or two trains per direction per day). The NEC is where Amtrak most consistently turns a profit against operating expenses, though that doesn’t necessarily cover the costs needed to maintain and upgrade the rails and power systems (for instance, much of the line uses an antiquated 25Hz power supply, unlike the 60Hz power used throughout the rest of the country, and it will cost billions to fix).

Shrinking down to just the NEC, or the NEC plus a few branch routes, probably wouldn’t be necessary. Under the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008, states must take over as primary funders of routes under 750 miles in length. States had until October 1st of this year to negotiate contracts, with October 16th (next Wednesday) set as the service cutoff date. Three states were still in talks at last count. So those routes (roughly 30 across the country) would probably still be able to operate going forward—but those are regional routes which would still become isolated from each other in many cases.

Most at risk are the long-distance trains, such as the Empire Builder which runs through Minnesota. These trains are still mandated under federal law, but don’t see any significant financial support from the states that they run through. Would the mandate to keep them running still be valid if the flow of federal money dries up? The long-distance routes are big, meaty targets simply because they are so long. The Empire Builder runs 2,200 miles, not counting the extra split it does near the west coast to serve both Portland and Seattle. In order to maintain daily service, four or five trains need to be in motion on that route at all times, as opposed to a short corridor route of the same frequency which would only need one or two sets of equipment. On the whole, the ticket revenue covers a similar percentage of operating costs on long-distance trains as it does on shorter routes, but shorter corridor trains have a history of needing some amount of state-level funding (which Amtrak counts as “revenue”—something to be wary of if you ever look at their monthly reports).

One possible solution, though it has its limits, is simply raising ticket prices on these routes. Passengers on the Empire Builder paid an average of 18 cents per mile in fiscal 2011, yet the train costs about 35 cents per passenger-mile to operate. Fare increases would be steep, but might barely be able to cover the gap. On the busy Saint Paul to Chicago segment, it’s hard to find a regular adult fare any lower than about 32 cents per mile—the fares get much cheaper in the less-populated areas west of the Twin Cities.

Going by that, Amtrak may already run at break-even along the Saint Paul to Chicago corridor, so one alternative could be to truncate the line here. The ridership picture would change drastically, since many people who get on or off within the MSP–CHI corridor are traveling to or from points farther west, but shortening the route would massively improve the on-time reliability of the train, particularly eastbound. The train usually picks up some delay on the way as it plies its way 1,800 miles from the Pacific Northwest to Saint Paul (earning the nickname “Late #8”), and these past couple of years have been particularly bad.

But the Empire Builder is not the most expensive of Amtrak’s routes. It has one of the best ratios of ticket revenue to operating cost of the long-distance services, so it may not be the first one cut if things came to that—the Southwest Chief and California Zephyr are both worse in terms of absolute-dollar subsidy. But the Builder isn’t far behind on that measure—despite a good operating ratio, the nature of the train and it’s long route both contribute to making it one of the most expensive routes to keep running, to the tune of about $57 million per year (though the $975 million to be spent on the new Vikings stadium could keep it running for 17 years).

Collectively, the long-distance trains need about $600 million per year to keep up with operating expenses. It’s not outside the realm of possibility that Amtrak would just start taking out loans to run the services for a while. The company now has its lowest debt load in more than a decade, so that could work for a short- to medium-term period. Of course, that’s dependent on credit markets still working properly. With the threat of federal default looming nearby, they could seize up again like in 2008.

What will actually happen? It’s hard to say. It probably shouldn’t be a top priority as compared to other effects of the shutdown, but it’s another thing to keep an eye on as the days turn into weeks. While hoping for the best, transportation officials in states, cities, and counties along long-distance routes should prepare by identifying funds that could be shifted to Amtrak if the need arises.

About Mike Hicks

Mike Hicks is a computer geek at heart, but has always had interests in transportation and urban planning. A longtime contributor to Wikipedia, he started a blog about trains and other transportation after realizing it had been two decades since he'd first heard about a potential high-speed rail line from Chicago to Minneapolis. Read more at

7 thoughts on “Amtrak versus the shutdown

  1. Walker

    Great post. What would it take for Amtrak to operate without subsidy? Can rail be made a more appealing alternative for more travelers? Can operations be more efficient? Is there an untapped or even not-yet-existing market?

    1. Tom H.

      I reckon that intercity rail could certainly operate without subsidy – it did for many decades! – if only it didn’t have to compete with a massively subsidized network of federal highways.

      $600M per year for long distance intercity passenger rail subsidies? If the feds only handed out $600M per year for highway projects, you’d see a lot more people taking the train.

    2. Mike Hicks Post author

      There are many answers to your questions. I tend to believe that the frequency of service and speed of Amtrak service is what holds them back, and there has never been a sustained effort to improve that, despite the fact that the original authorizing legislation for Amtrak said that the system was supposed to be improved to an average speed of 60 mph — most Amtrak routes are in the range of 45-55 mph on average, and some drop down into the 30s. But even if a train ran at 200 mph, it wouldn’t be very popular if it only ran once a day. People in other developed countries would probably scoff at lines that had 4 trains per day, let alone just one, but the number of corridors that have that level of service in the U.S. is pretty small.

      The Northeast Corridor makes a decent amount of money each year, even though the trains there aren’t especially fast either. If it gets built, the Northern Lights Express to Duluth will be almost as fast as the Acela Express between New York and Boston. If there were a half-dozen corridors around the country that had trains averaging 70 mph and had service frequencies on the order of once every 1-2 hours, they’d almost certainly be able to operate at a profit day-to-day (though they’d still likely need capital dollars to initially build the lines and buy equipment). The Chicago-St. Louis corridor is one example of an effort to do something like that.

      I tend to blame most of Amtrak’s problems on the fact that it’s always been a political hot-potato, but it has had operational issues that need to be acknowledge too. One of my biggest issues is that they’ve historically had very poor accounting of costs — the price to operate a corridor has primarily been allocated with formulas rather than directly measured, so there are probably inefficiencies that the company doesn’t even know about — and that also means that some good routes get blamed for costs incurred by others. They probably over-staff their trains a bit, often with at least one crew member per passenger car, so that could be trimmed.

      There are a number of untapped markets — Phoenix doesn’t have any Amtrak service, for instance, despite the fact that they’d be a good candidate for frequent service to southern California.

  2. Andrew B

    A Minneapolis-Chicago route makes so much sense, it drives me crazy that it is always so badly delayed and under-served because it’s tied to the longer route over the rockies.

    1. Nathanael

      Wisconsin and Minnesota were going to fund a Minneapolis-Chicago route. Then Wisconsin elected Governor Walker (a.k.a. Snidely Whiplash) and canceled the project.

      I guess Minnesota has to fund it on its own now.

      1. Mike Hicks Post author

        Wisconsin pulled out of the plans for multi-trip-per-day 110-mph service, but has still been cooperating with Minnesota on adding a second daily trip between the Twin Cities and Chicago. I haven’t seen any specific updates on that for a while, though — Amtrak ran a 9-month study of the corridor, but I haven’t seen the results published anywhere yet.

  3. Nathanael

    FWIW, Amtrak built up quite a large cash cushion in anticipation of the shutdown, and the state contracts (all except Indiana are signed) should allow it to ride out a fairly long shutdown. Before Amtrak gets in trouble from the shutdown, we’re going to see things like the FAA air traffic control shutting down.

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